In his seminal work, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 , historian Robert M. Citino argues that the year 1942 was not just a turning point in World War II, but the final gasp of a centuries-old "German way of war". While 1941’s failure at Moscow hinted at the end, 1942 was when the traditional Prussian tactics of maneuver ( Bewegungskrieg ) finally collapsed under the weight of modern industrial warfare. The Illusion of Victory
The year began with a series of staggering, yet deceptive, German successes. Citino reconstructs these campaigns to show how the Wehrmacht still possessed lethal operational excellence: Death of the Wehrmacht :The German Campaigns of...
: By 1942, Germany lacked the resources to launch offensives across the entire Eastern Front. They narrowed their focus to the southern sector (Operation Blue) to seize oil and grain, but even this limited goal proved too vast. In his seminal work, Death of the Wehrmacht:
Despite these wins, Citino identifies several fatal flaws that led to the "death" of the Wehrmacht as an effective fighting force: The Illusion of Victory The year began with
: The traditional Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics)—which allowed subordinate commanders great flexibility—was strangled by Hitler's increasing micromanagement and the rise of radio communication, which gave high command a "tight leash" on tactical movements.
: Rebounding from the 1941 winter disaster, German forces secured massive victories at Sevastopol and Kharkov, encircling entire Soviet armies.